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Associative Self-Anchoring Interacts
with Obtainability of Chosen Objects
Charlotte Prévost*, Niall Bolger and Dean Mobbs*
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
While there is evidence that implicit self-esteem transfers to chosen objects (associative
self-anchoring), it is still unknown whether this phenomenon extends to explicit self-
esteem. Moreover, whether the knowledge that these objects might belong to the self in
the future or not affects the evaluation of these objects has received little attention. Here,
we demonstrate that evaluations of chosen objects are further enhanced when they are
obtainable as compared to when they are not in participants with high explicit self-
esteem, whereas participants with low explicit self-esteem exhibit the opposite pattern.
These findings extend previous results and shed new light on the role of self-esteem in
altering preferences for chosen objects depending on their obtainability.
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INTRODUCTION
Self-esteem promotes ‘positive illusions’ such as overly positive self-evaluations, exaggerated
perceptions of control and unrealistic optimism; resulting in increased well-being and mental
health (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Consistent with the idea that people with a higher sense of self-
esteem are better at deceiving themselves, self-esteem has also been suggested to play a key role
in the enhancement of valuation of chosen objects. For instance, it has been shown that when
choosing an object, an association between the self and the object is formed, a phenomenon
referred to as associative self-anchoring (Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996; Gawronski et al., 2007).
Consequently, evaluations of the self transfer to the chosen object such that the evaluation of the
chosen object is modulated by implicit self-esteem rather than cognitive dissonance (Gawronski
and Strack, 2004; Gawronski et al., 2007). For instance, Gawronski et al. (2007) asked participants to
make implicit evaluations of two pictures before choosing between them, and showed that implicit
evaluations of the chosen picture depend on implicit evaluations of the self. Implicit self-esteem
is commonly measured using an initials preference task where participants are asked to rate the
likeability of all letters of the alphabet presented in a random order on a 1–5 Likert scale. The
preference for one’s own initials is subsequently interpreted as an index of implicit self-esteem.
Conversely, explicit self-esteem is measured using questionnaires asking participants to directly
reﬂect on their self-evaluation (e.g., by indicating on a 1–7 Likert scale how much they agree
with the following statement: “I have high self-esteem”). Thus, while implicit self-esteem refers
to an automatic or unconscious self-evaluation, explicit self-esteem refers to a more conscious and
reﬂective evaluation. Yet, it is still unknown whether associative self-anchoring extends to explicit
self-esteem.
Low self-esteem has been associated with an increased tendency to exhibit reactant behavior
in the case of freedom elimination (Joubert, 1990). According to psychological reactance theory,
eliminating a behavioral freedom previously established will induce a motivational state aimed at
restoring the lost freedom, such that a chosen object no longer obtainable will be perceived as more
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attractive (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981). However,
whether self-esteem diﬀerentially aﬀects the evaluation of chosen
objects based on the opportunity of actually receiving these
objects has remained untested.
Drawing on the associative self-anchoring account and
psychological reactance theory, we hypothesized that people
with a high sense of explicit self-esteem would exhibit
enhanced evaluations for chosen objects that they might
obtain compared to chosen objects that are not obtainable,
whereas people with low explicit self-esteem would exhibit
enhanced evaluations for chosen objects that are not obtainable
compared to chosen objects that are obtainable. To test these
predictions, we designed a paradigm where participants were
asked to indicate relative evaluations for one of two objects
presented side-by-side before and after choosing one of them
in conditions where chosen objects were obtainable (i.e., one of
the chosen object would randomly be selected by the computer
and given to them at the end of the experiment) or not
(Figure 1).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-eight Columbia University students (15 females) with
a mean age of 22.71 ± 4.40 participated in the study. All
participants were free of neurological or psychiatric disorders
and had normal or correct-to-normal vision. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants, and the study was
approved by the Columbia University research ethics committee.
Experimental Procedure
The experiment was performed simultaneously by two gender-
matched participants in two separate testing rooms. Upon arrival,
participants were told that they would be administered the
same task at the same time. The experiment included ﬁve
diﬀerent tasks and lasted approximately 1 h, followed by a
short post-experiment questionnaire and the single item self-
esteem questionnaire (Robins et al., 2001). In this questionnaire,
participants had to indicate by moving a cursor along a 1–7 Likert
scale (increments of 1) to what extent the statement “I have high
self-esteem” was true of them (mean score = 5.28± 1.06).
Stimuli consisted of 280 objects from the Columbia University
bookstore, which were presented in pairs, two objects at a time
side-by-side (Figure 1).
Evaluation Task 1
To assess participants’ relative evaluations of all 140 pairs of
objects, we asked them to imagine how much they would prefer
to obtain each object relative to the other object at the end
of the experiment (Figure 1A). These evaluations were relative
in that increasing the evaluation of one object (i.e., by adding
more stars) automatically decreased the evaluation of the other
object (i.e., by removing stars). Participants were instructed about
the meaning of each star combination, namely: three stars for
each object indicated an equal preference, 2.5 stars for one of
the objects versus 3.5 stars for the other object indicated a
moderate preference, 2 stars versus 4 stars indicated a strong
preference for one of the objects over the other object, 1.5
stars versus 4.5 stars indicated a very strong preference and
1 star versus 5 stars indicated an extremely strong preference.
Evaluations were made in a self-paced manner, separated by
an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 1–5 s. All pairs of items were
assigned randomly across subjects. Each item was only presented
once.
The purpose for Evaluation task 1 was twofold. First, it
provided us with relative evaluations for each pair of objects,
and second, it allowed us to extract only those pairs of objects
for which a change in evaluation could be optimally detected.
Indeed, pairs of objects for which one of the two objects was
very strongly to extremely strongly preferred (i.e., 1.5 versus
4.5 stars, or 1 versus 5 stars) were not optimized to allow for
an evaluation enhancement of the favored object because of
a ceiling eﬀect, while pairs of objects with equal evaluations
(i.e., three stars for each object) were not optimal to trigger
reactant behavior, which is expressed by an increase in the
attractiveness of the unobtainable alternative proportional to
its original relative evaluation (Brehm, 1966). Thus, 80 pairs
of objects for which one of the two objects was moderately
to strongly preferred (i.e., 2.5 versus 3.5 stars, or 2 versus 4
stars) were selected and included in subsequent tasks. If 80 pairs
of objects with these combinations were not available for any
given participant, we selected the number of pairs with these
combinations that were available, using a criterion of a minimum
of 50 pairs (note that all participants met this criterion). On
average, participants were presented with 64.61 ± 13.64 choice
pairs (median= 64).
The rationale for having participants make initial preference
ratings between two items presented at a time rather than have
them rate each item independently as is usually done in cognitive
dissonance experiments (Sharot et al., 2009, 2012; Izuma et al.,
2010; Jarcho et al., 2011; Qin et al., 2011; Kitayama et al., 2013)
was to avoid the possible confounds raised by Chen and Risen
(Chen and Risen, 2010; Izuma and Murayama, 2013). Indeed,
in the conventional “Free Choice Paradigm,” participants are
ﬁrst asked to provide individual ratings for a number of items.
They are then asked to make choices between two items that
have either similar ratings (“diﬃcult choices”) or signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent ratings (“easy choices”), before re-evaluating each of
these items separately. A critical issue associated with this
paradigm is that the two items previously rated independently
are then evaluated side-by-side at the time of choice, which
provides additional information about true preference, and bias
measured attitude change following choices. Accordingly, it was
shown that the spread of alternative observed following diﬃcult
choices could occur in the absence of a preference change and
thus, without experiencing dissonance (Chen and Risen, 2010;
Izuma and Murayama, 2013). Note that Izuma and Murayama
(2013) demonstrated that choices involving diﬀerently valued
alternatives were not aﬀected by spurious dissonance eﬀects
in this paradigm. Thus, in the current experiment, possible
confounds were avoided by (1) measuring true preference by
having participants evaluate the items relative to one another and
(2) making choices between diﬀerently valued alternatives.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design illustration. (A) Participants first evaluated objects relative to one another. (B) In Choice task 1, they were asked to choose the
object they liked most. (C) Subsequently, they evaluated again the pairs of objects presented during Choice task 1. (D) In Choice task 2, participants made choices
again between two objects but one of the two objects was then selected by the computer. (E) Finally, participants evaluated the pairs of objects presented during
Choice task 2.
Choice Task 1
Participants were presented with 40 of the 80 pairs of objects
selected in Evaluation task 1, presented in a random order. On
each trial, they were asked to make spontaneous decisions and
were given 3 s to choose the object they would most prefer
obtaining at the end of the experiment. Their selection was then
highlighted by a green frame for 2 s and the trial ended with
a 1–5 s jittered ITI (Figure 1B). Importantly, participants were
instructed that at the end of the experiment, one of the selected
objects throughout the experiment would be randomly picked by
the computer and given to them.
Evaluation Task 2
Participants were then asked to re-evaluate these 40 pairs of items,
like they did in Evaluation task 1 (Figure 1C). All pairs of objects
were presented in a random order.
Choice Task 2
The procedure was identical to Choice task 1, the only exception
being that after making their choice, a red frame appeared
on the screen for 2 s (Figure 1D). Participants were told
that this task was synchronized with the other participant
and that on each trial the computer would randomly select
either their own choice, or that of the other participant.
Importantly, participants were instructed to pay close attention
to the objects highlighted in red because the object they would
receive at the end of the experiment would be randomly
selected among the objects they selected during Choice task
1 or amongst the items highlighted in red during Choice
task 2. In reality, the tasks were not synchronized and the
choices highlighted in red were pre-determined so that half the
time the feedback would be congruent with the participant’s
choice, and half the time, it would be incongruent with their
choice.
This task consisted of 80 trials, including the 40 pairs of objects
used in Choice task 1 and the remaining 40 pairs of objects
selected after Evaluation task 1. They were all presented in a
random order. Note that the change in evaluation did not diﬀer
between the pairs of objects used in both Choice tasks versus
the pairs of objects used in Choice task 2 only [paired t-test,
t(27) = 0.22, p = 0.89], thus further analyses do not distinguish
between these pairs of objects.
Note that the order of the sessions and the frame color
highlighting the participant’s selection were not counterbalanced
across subjects and choice tasks, which might be potential
limitations to the current design.
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Evaluation Task 3
Participants were asked to re-evaluate the pairs of objects used
in Choice task 2, like they did in previous Evaluation tasks
(Figure 1E). All pairs of objects were presented in a random
order.
Quantifying evaluation change
For each pair of objects presented, the evaluation of one object
was made relative to the other object (i.e., an increase in the
evaluation of one object necessarily implied a decrease in the
evaluation of the other object). Therefore, we only report the
evaluation change for the chosen object.
Evaluation Change Elicited by Choice Task 1
For each trial t, Evaluation Change Scores for Choice task 1 (ECS-
1) were computed as follows:
ECS-1(t) = rating from Evaluation task 2 for chosen object
(t) – rating from Evaluation task 1 for chosen object (t).
To create an ECS-1 for each participant P, we averaged ECS-1
across all trials for that particular participant as follows:
ECS-1-M(P)=mean (ECS-1(t)).
Evaluation Change Elicited by Choice Task 2
Based on participants’ reports from previous pilot studies,
‘congruent’ trials (i.e., when the computer selected the chosen
object) were excluded from analyses reported in the Results
section. Despite being obtainable, chosen objects in congruent
trials elicited various interpretations across participants. Some
participants thought that it meant that the computer had
randomly elected their own choice every time while in reality
it could also mean that the computer had selected the other
participant’s choice (which was similar to theirs). In addition, and
regardless of this distinction, some participants reported being
happy when the computer’s choice was congruent with theirs
because that meant that they still had a chance to obtain the
chosen object. On the other hand, some participants reported
being unsatisﬁed during Choice task 2 in general because they
had no control over the outcome. Therefore, given the multitude
of interpretations possible for congruent trials and the diﬀerent
cognitive processes that might have been involved during these
trials, they were not considered further. Note that in the case
of incongruent trials, participants interpreted the fact that their
choice was not selected as the computer having selected the
other participant’s choice, as explained in the instructions.
Thus, incongruent trials did not involve analogous possible
misinterpretations.
Evaluation Change Scores for Choice task 2 (ECS-2) were
computed as follows for each trial t:
ECS-2(t) = rating from Evaluation task 3 for chosen object
(t) – rating from Evaluation task 1 for chosen object (t).
Note that computing ECS-2(t) using the rating from
Evaluation task 2 for the chosen object (t) when available
(that is for the choice pairs used in Choice Task 1) did not
qualitatively alter our results (2x2 ANOVA, factor Evaluation
change: [F(1,55) = 0.01, p = 0.91], factor explicit self-esteem:
[F(1,55)= 0.43, p= 0.51], interaction: [F(1,55)= 5.47, p= 0.02].
To create an ECS-2 for each participant P, we averaged ECS-2
across all trials for that particular participant as follows:
ECS-2-M(P)=mean (ECS-2(t)).
For completeness, we conducted similar analyses to the one
reported in the Results section replacing ECS-1-M with either (1)
the congruent trials from Choice task 2 alone, or replacing it with
(2) ECS-1-M + congruent trials from Choice task 2. The results
from these 2x2 ANOVAs did not qualitatively diﬀer from the
analysis reported in Section “Results” and the interaction between
the factors Evaluation change and explicit self-esteem remained
virtually signiﬁcant in both analyses Analysis 1: no main eﬀect
for the factor Evaluation change [F(1,55)= 0.74, p= 0.39] or the
factor explicit self-esteem [F(1,55) = 2.9, p = 0.09], interaction
between these two factors [F(1,55) = 3.55, p = 0.06]; Analysis 2:
no main eﬀect for the factor Evaluation change [F(1,55) = 0.36,
p= 0.55] or the factor explicit self-esteem [F(1,55)= 0, p= 0.97],
interaction between these two factors [F(1,55)= 3, p= 0.08].
Statistical Analysis
All statistical tests were performed using Matlab 7.9.0 (R2009b).
The linear regression modeling the relationship between the
evaluation of chosen objects (dependent variable) and explicit
self-esteem (independent variable) was performed using the
corrcoef function. The 2x2 ANOVA with the factors Evaluation
change (ECS-1-M versus ECS-2-M) and explicit self-esteem
(High versus Low self-esteem) was performed using the
anova2 function. One-sample t-tests were performed using
the ttest function, and two-sample t-tests were performed using
the ttest2 function. Note that all statistical tests are two-tailed
unless stated otherwise.
RESULTS
As predicted, the evaluation of chosen objects that were
obtainable (ECS-1-M) was enhanced as a function of explicit
self-esteem (linear regression; r = 0.45, p < 0.05). Additionally,
we conducted a 2x2 ANOVA with the factors Evaluation change
(ECS-1-M versus ECS-2-M) and explicit self-esteem (High versus
Low self-esteem) to test for diﬀerences between participants
with high versus low explicit self-esteem in their tendency to
enhance their evaluation of chosen objects depending on their
obtainability. A median split was used to create the High self-
esteem group (14 participants) and the Low self-esteem group (14
participants). This analysis revealed no main eﬀect for the factor
Evaluation change [F(1,55)= 0.03, p= 0.87] or the factor explicit
self-esteem [F(1,55) = 0.77, p = 0.38; Figure 2]. As expected,
we found a signiﬁcant interaction between these two factors
[F(1,55) = 6.75, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.11], such that participants in
the high self-esteem group exhibited more Evaluation change for
chosen objects that were obtainable compared to chosen objects
that were unobtainable [M = 0.19, SD = 0.33, t(13) = 2.13,
p = 0.05, d = 0.77] whereas participants in the low self-esteem
group exhibited more evaluation change for chosen objects
that were unobtainable compared to those that were obtainable
[M = 0.17, SD= 0.23, t(13)= 2.67, p= 0.02, d = 0.59].
Interestingly, when asked in a post-experiment questionnaire
whether they felt that their evaluations had changed following
either Choice task, participants reported that their relative
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FIGURE 2 | Interaction between the factors evaluation change of
chosen objects according to their obtainibility (ECS-1-M versus
ECS-2-M) and explicit self-esteem (Low versus High group; 2x2
ANOVA). Participants in the high explicit self-esteem group showed more
evaluation change of chosen objects when they were obtainable [one-tailed
paired t-test, t(26) = 2.02, p = 0.03] while those in the low explicit self-esteem
group showed increased preference for chosen objects that were
unobtainable [one-tailed paired t-test, t(26) = −1.67, p = 0.05]. Error bars
represent SEM.
evaluation for the chosen object remained unchanged following
Choice task 1 [M = 5.46, SD = 1.73, t(27) = 1.42, p = 0.17, one
sample t-test comparing the mean to the neutral value 5 on our
1–9 Likert scale] and Choice task 2 [M = 5, SD= 1.72, t(27)= 0,
p= 1, one sample t-test comparing the mean to the neutral value
5 on our 1–9 Likert scale]. This suggests that evaluation change
occurred without participants’ awareness, and regardless of the
obtainability of the chosen object.
DISCUSSION
The present results provide preliminary evidence indicating
that obtainability of chosen objects diﬀerentially impacts the
evaluation of these objects according to one’s sense of explicit self-
esteem. Speciﬁcally, participants with high self-esteem increased
their relative evaluation of chosen objects further when they
may be obtained in the future as compared to when they were
unobtainable, whereas participants with low self-esteem showed
the reverse pattern.
First, we provide evidence suggesting that explicit self-esteem
modulates evaluations of chosen objects that are obtainable in
a self-serving way, extending prior ﬁndings demonstrating a
similar modulation by implicit self-esteem (Gawronski et al.,
2007). This ﬁnding accords well with the idea that the act
of choosing an object that we may later belong to the self
generates an association between this object and the self,
giving rise to a transfer of self-evaluation to the chosen
object, a phenomenon referred to as associative self-anchoring
(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Cadinu and Rothbart, 1996;
Walther and Trasselli, 2003; Gawronski et al., 2007). Consistent
with the idea that associative self-anchoring is independent from
dissonance reduction processes (Gawronski and Bodenhausen,
2006; Gawronski et al., 2007), all objects within each pair of
objects used in the current study were diﬀerently valued and thus,
should not elicit cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-
Jones and Mills, 1999). Indeed, it has long been argued that
having to choose between equally attractive alternatives generates
cognitive dissonance which will be reduced through a spreading-
of-alternatives eﬀect, whereby positive features of the chosen
alternative and negative features of the rejected alternative are
emphasized (Brehm, 1956; Frey, 1986; Olson and Stone, 2005),
an eﬀect that has not received support in the case of diﬀerently
valued alternatives (Brehm, 1956; Sharot et al., 2009; Kitayama
et al., 2013).
Furthermore, our ﬁndings might relate to psychological
reactance theory which, applied to the current case, would predict
that eliminating the possibility of receiving a chosen object
increases the attractiveness of this object (Brehm, 1966; Brehm
and Brehm, 1981). Consistent with previous ﬁndings showing a
negative relationship between explicit self-esteem and reactant
behavior (Joubert, 1990), we found that participants with low
explicit self-esteem exhibited enhanced evaluations for chosen
objects that were unobtainable compared to objects that were
obtainable, an eﬀect that was reversed in participants with high
explicit self-esteem. Note that in the case of threat to freedom
(as opposed to elimination of freedom as is the case in the
current study), self-esteem has been shown to correlate positively
with reactant behavior (Brockner and Elkind, 1985); however it
is not surprising that the relationship between self-esteem and
psychological reactance reverses depending on whether there is
a possibility for freedom restoration.
One limitation of the current research is the relatively small
sample size (n = 28) which leads our results to be preliminary.
The fact that explicit self-esteem was measured at the end,
rather than at the beginning of the experiment, places another
potential limitation. Indeed, performing the task might have
somehow modulated participants’ sense of self-esteem, resulting
in a measure of state explicit self-esteem rather than trait explicit
self-esteem. However, given that the questionnaire explicitly
examines trait self-esteem, and that the paradigm should not
lower self-esteem at least to the capacity where it would drive
the robust results presented here, we expect that any state eﬀect
to be negligible. Also, we cannot rule out the possibility that
some of the choices might have been surprising to the participant.
However, given that (1) choices are subjective in nature, (2) the
two participants performing the experiment simultaneously did
not know each other, and (3) the items we used in the experiment
were all within a narrow price range, we believe that suspicions
were kept to a minimum and did not interfere with the purpose
of the experiment. Finally, it is important to note that the social
impact of decisions (i.e., other’s rejection of an item) may impact
one’s preferences and future studies should probe the eﬀects of
social or any other bias.
Linking our ﬁndings to positive illusions, participants with
high self-esteem distorted the perception of chosen objects in
a positive light compared to participants with low self-esteem,
such that the relative attractiveness of these objects was enhanced
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further when there was a possibility for these objects to belong to
them (Taylor and Brown, 1988). It is interesting to speculate that
the rationalization deﬁciency exhibited by people with low self-
esteem together with their tendency to ruminate over negative
consequences might relate to the well-known correspondence
between low self-esteem, depression and anxiety (Sowislo and
Orth, 2013).
However, it is important to note that in accordance with the
consistency bias where past attitudes are incorrectly remembered
to resemble present’s attitudes, participants’ reports suggest that
they were not aware of the fact that their evaluations changed
between the diﬀerent evaluation tasks. Consistent with the fact
that participants were not aware of altering their evaluations,
preference change has been shown to be an implicit process
(Sharot et al., 2010; Jarcho et al., 2011; Coppin et al., 2012, 2014),
an idea further exempliﬁed by studies conducted in monkeys,
children and amnesic patients (Lieberman et al., 2001; Egan
et al., 2007, 2010). Although some of the dissonance studies
cited above suﬀered from the artifact raised by Chen and
Risen (2010) and should be interpreted with caution, there is
emerging evidence that the change in evaluation we observe
might reﬂect a non-conscious mechanism serving important
adaptive purposes. Indeed, being contented with what might
be part of one’s environment, rather than dwelling upon what
could have been might act as a positive reinforcement loop,
whereby associative self-anchoring induces a positive feeling that
further enhances self-esteem, and ultimately well-being (Taylor
and Brown, 1988).
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